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Abstract
Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess
private information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technol-
ogy, valuations of the prize, cost functions, and budget constraints. We find general
conditions under which a given contest of incomplete information admits a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, provided that all players have positive
budgets in all states of the world, existence requires only the usual concavity and
convexity assumptions. Information structures that satisfy our conditions for unique-
ness include independent private valuations, correlated private values, pure common
values, and examples of interdependent valuations. The results allow dealing with
inactive types, asymmetric equilibria, population uncertainty, and the possibility of
resale. It is also shown that any player that is active with positive probability ends up
with a positive net rent.
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1 Introduction
Contest theory has emerged from the study of important economic problems in areas
such as marketing, patent races, R&D, promotion tournaments, political campaigning,
legal disputes, lobbying, sports, and military conflict.1 As one of its main objectives,
the literature has sought to characterize the extent of rent dissipation, i.e., the share
of the contested rent that is spent by the competing parties in an attempt to win the
contest. Of some value, however, is typically also the assurance that a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. In particular, the existence of a unique equi-
librium may be useful for reasons such as analytical convenience, predictive power,
comparative statics, and global stability.
This paper offers general conditions sufficient for the existence and uniqueness
of pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in incomplete-information con-
tests over arbitrary finite state spaces. In the class of contests considered, players may
possess private information about the primitives of the conflict, i.e., about the con-
test technology, valuations, cost functions, and budget constraints. Our assumptions
directly generalize the conditions formulated by Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997).
Thus, we deal with contests of the logit form, for which Tullock’s (1980) rent-seeking
game is an important example.
Regarding existence, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in a large
class of incomplete-information contests, provided that no player ever deems it possi-
ble being the only one with a positive budget in a state where the technology of success
is discontinuous. This result is obtained through the consideration of a sequence of
contests with smaller and smaller minimum bids. Indeed, under the assumptions that
will be imposed, any discontinuity at the origin does not matter, essentially because
small positive bids in a contest of the logit form create very strong incentives to over-
bid. Our conditions for existence can be further relaxed in certain circumstances, e.g.,
when the slope of the state-dependent impact function is infinite at the zero bid level,
or when the contest is symmetric. However, we also present an example of a contest
with incomplete information that does not satisfy our assumptions and that does not
admit any equilibrium (even though all posterior beliefs assign positive probability to
the possibility that the respective opponent has a positive budget).2
Regarding uniqueness, our contribution has four main elements. First, we extend
Rosen’s (1965) notion of “diagonal strict concavity” to a class of n-player logit con-
tests. The extension is needed because, even in a standard Tullock contest, payoff
functions are neither continuous nor strictly concave (at the boundary).3 Second, we
show that, under standard assumptions, any n-player logit contest satisfies the suf-
1 See Vojnovic´ (2016) for an introduction to the theory of contests.
2 Einy et al. (2015) independently proved existence in a framework similar to ours. In fact, some of the
steps in their initial proof (Einy et al. 2013) happen to correspond to steps in our proof. However, Einy
et al. (2015) do not allow for budget constraints. More importantly, they do not offer general conditions for
uniqueness. See also the discussion of the related literature in Sect. 2.
3 For the same reasons, Ui’s (2016, Cor. 6) recent extension of Rosen’s theorem actually fails to apply to
Tullock’s rent-seeking game.
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ficient conditions of Goodman (1980) in the interior of the set of strategy profiles.4
Third, we identify a simple assumption on the information structure that ensures that
the uniqueness proof goes through. Thereby, we can deal not only with independent
private valuations, correlated private values, and pure common values, but also with
examples of interdependent valuations. Finally, we show that the pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium remains unique in the larger set of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
Several papers have stressed the role of budget constraints for the outcome of
contests.5 Our framework accounts for this possibility by allowing for type-dependent
budget constraints. This creates a variety of modeling choices. For example, under
the assumption of convex and strictly increasing cost functions, a budget may be so
generous that it never binds. At the opposite extreme, any type with a zero budget will
be effectively excluded from being active in the contest. This latter possibility may
then be used, for example, to deal with the case with population uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The related literature is dis-
cussed in Sect. 2. Section 3 introduces the setup and notation. Existence is dealt with
in Sect. 4, while Sect. 5 discusses uniqueness. Section 6 considers symmetric con-
tests. Applications are provided in Sect. 7. Section 8 concludes. All proofs have been
relegated to an Appendix.
2 Related literature
The existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in imperfectly
discriminating contests have been studied quite thoroughly in the case of complete
information (Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992; Baye et al. 1993; Szidarovszky and
Okuguchi 1997; Esteban and Ray 1999; Cornes and Hartley 2005, 2012; Yamazaki
2008, 2009; Franke and Öztürk 2015), and in the case of symmetrically informed
contestants (Einy et al. 2017). For contests with incomplete information, however, be
it with one-sided incomplete information and continuous types (Hurley and Shogren
1998a), discrete type spaces (Hurley and Shogren 1998b; Malueg and Yates 2004;
Schoonbeek and Winkel 2006), a continuously distributed common valuation (Harstad
1995; Wärneryd 2003, 2012; Rentschler 2009), continuously and independently dis-
tributed marginal costs (Fey 2008; Ryvkin 2010; Wasser 2013a), or continuously
distributed interdependent valuations (Wasser 2013b), the results have been overall
somewhat less comprehensive.
There has been fairly little work especially on the issue of uniqueness of an equilib-
rium in a contest with incomplete information. A notable exception is the seminal paper
on contests with two-sided incomplete information, Hurley and Shogren (1998b). Con-
sidering a private valuations framework with two players, where one player has two
4 Franke and Öztürk (2015, p. 105) have applied Goodman’s result to networks of two-player contests with
continuous technologies and complete information. However, as they emphasize, their proof crucially relies
on the additive separability of payoffs across opponents, which is, in general, not satisfied in contests with
incomplete information.
5 For example, Leininger (1991) emphasized the role of research budgets for the persistence of monopoly. In
the literature on lobbying caps (Che and Gale 1998), the introduction of spending limits reduces preemption
and may thereby increase the expected revenue of a politician. Konrad (2012) studied the formation of
alliances whose members share private information on budgets.
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types and the other player has three types, they have shown that there is at most one
interior equilibrium. While interesting, their application of the index theorem is actu-
ally quite involved, and it is not obvious that the approach could be generalized. Even if
a generalization was feasible, boundary equilibria would remain a possibility. Another
notable exception is Wasser (2013a) who proves uniqueness in a class of IPV contests
with continuous and strictly concave payoff functions. However, that result requires
parametric assumptions.6
Although some results of the present analysis extend to continuous, independently
distributed types (first-named author 2014), our focus on finite state spaces leads to
additional flexibility in other dimensions. Specifically, in the analysis below, private
information may concern not only a marginal cost parameter but also the contest
technology, valuations, the shape of cost functions, and budget constraints. Moreover,
the present analysis is not restricted to the IPV framework, but allows for a very large
variety of alternative information structures. Of course, dealing with these possibilities
leads, in particular, to additional complications in the proofs.
Equilibrium existence in a state-space framework has been studied also by Einy
et al. (2015). Their main result, derived through an application of Reny’s theorem, is
complementary to Theorem 1 in that their conditions are consistent with countably
infinite information partitions and nonsmooth contest technologies. However, as men-
tioned before, Einy et al. (2015) do not allow for budget constraints, nor do they offer
general conditions for uniqueness.7
3 Setup and notation
There are n ≥ 2 contestants, or players, collected in a set N = {1, . . . , n}. All
uncertainty about the primitives of the contest is summarized in a state variable ω that
is drawn ex ante from a finite state space . We denote by q(ω) the ex ante probability
of state ω, where we assume q(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ .
Just before the contest, each player i ∈ N receives a signal (or type) θi = ti (ω)
from a nonempty signal space i . Signals are private information, i.e., player i does
not observe the signal θ j = t j (ω) received by any other player j = i . We denote by
Pi (θi ) = {ω ∈ |ti (ω) = θi } the set of states deemed possible by type θi , and assume
that Pi (θi ) = ∅. Then, clearly, the (unconditional) probability that a given signal θi
realizes, i.e., qi (θi ) = ∑ω∈Pi (θi )q(ω), is positive for any i ∈ N and θi ∈ i . Finally,
we assume that each type θi ∈ i of any player i ∈ N forms a posterior qi (·|θi ) on
 via Bayes’ rule, so that qi (ω|θi ) = q(ω)/qi (θi ) if ω ∈ Pi (θi ), and qi (ω|θi ) = 0
otherwise.
After observing θi ∈ i , each player i ∈ N chooses an expenditure level, or
bid, xi = βi (θi ) ∈ [0, xmaxi (θi )], where xmaxi (θi ) ≥ 0 denotes the budget of type
θi . It is worthwhile to note that, in contrast to the other primitives of the model,
budgets are functions of the type rather than of the state. Note also that assuming
6 To prove uniqueness, Wasser (2013a) employs techniques due to Mason and Valentinyi (2010).
7 To deal with PSNE existence in isolation, one may alternatively assume that strategy spaces are discrete
(see, e.g., Singh and Wittman 1988). However, that assumption tends to make uniqueness less likely, even
under complete information.
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a finite budget for all players in all states of the world does not entail any loss of
generality provided that (as will be assumed below) cost functions are convex and
strictly increasing.8 Moreover, as will be illustrated, our assumptions allow for the
possibility that xmaxi (θi ) = 0, in which case type θi has a zero budget.
Contestant i’s probability of winning in state ω is given by
pi,ω(x1, . . . , xn) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
fi,ω(xi )
f1,ω(x1) + · · · + fn,ω(xn) if f1,ω(x1) + · · · + fn,ω(xn) > 0
p0i,ω if f1,ω(x1) + · · · + fn,ω(xn) = 0,
(1)
where fi,ω(·) ≥ 0 is player i’s impact function in state ω, and where p0i,ω ∈ [0, 1]
satisfies p01,ω + · · · + p0n,ω ≤ 1.9 For instance, p01,ω = · · · = p0n,ω = 1n or p01,ω =
· · · = p0n,ω = 0, as in popular specifications of Tullock’s and other logit contests. For
a state ω ∈ , we will say that the contest is discontinuous in ω when f1,ω(0)+· · ·+
fn,ω(0) = 0. Clearly, p0i,ω needs to be specified only for states ω in which the contest
is discontinuous. Player i’s ex post payoff, or net rent, in state ω is now given by
i,ω(x1, . . . , xn) = pi,ω(x1, . . . , xn)vi (ω) − ci,ω(xi ), (2)
where vi (ω) > 0 is i’s valuation of winning, and ci,ω(xi ) is i’s cost, both in state ω.
A bid schedule for player i is a mapping βi : i → R+ ≡ [0,∞) such that
βi (θi ) ∈ [0, xmaxi (θi )]. The set of i’s bid schedules is denoted by Bi . For a given
profile of bid schedules β−i = {β j } j =i ∈ B−i ≡ ∏ j =i B j , denote by β−i (t−i (ω)) ={β j (t j (ω))} j =i the profile of bids resulting in state ω, where t−i (ω) = {t j (ω)} j =i is
the corresponding profile of type realizations. Similarly, for any β = {βi }ni=1 ∈ B ≡∏n
i=1 Bi , we will write β(t(ω)) = {βi (ti (ω))}ni=1, with t(ω) = {ti (ω)}ni=1. The interim
expected payoff for type θi ∈ i of player i , when bidding xi ∈ [0, xmaxi (θi )] against
a profile of bid schedules β−i ∈ B−i , is given as
i (xi , β−i , θi ) =
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )i,ω(xi , β−i (t−i (ω))). (3)
By an incomplete-information contest C, we mean the Bayesian n-player game just
described. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in the incomplete-information
contestC is a profile of bid schedulesβ∗ = {β∗i }ni=1 ∈ B such thati (β∗i (θi ), β∗−i , θi ) ≥
i (xi , β
∗−i , θi ), for any i ∈ N , any θi ∈ i , and any xi ∈ [0, xmaxi (θi )].
Some of our results concern mixed strategies, where randomization over the con-
tinuous bid space is modeled as in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). Formally, a mixed
strategy bi for player i assigns to each θi ∈ i a probability measure bi (θi ) on (the
Borel subsets of) the interval [0, xmaxi (θi )]. Thus, we assume that types randomize
8 Yamazaki (2008) used a similar argument.
9 State-contingent impact functions arise, for example, when there is incomplete information about abil-
ities (Baik and Shogren 1995; Clark 1997; Epstein and Mealem 2013) or about technological parameters
(Grossmann 2014; Heijnen and Schoonbeek 2019).
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independently. Given a profile of mixed strategies b−i = {b j } j =i , type θi ’s expected
payoff from a mixed strategy bi reads
i (bi (θi ), b−i , θi ) =
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )Eb(t(ω))
[
i,ω(x)
]
, (4)
where the expectation Eb(t(ω)) [·] at state ω ∈ Pi (θi ) is taken over the realiza-
tions of bid profiles x = (x1, . . . , xn) according to the product measure b(t(ω)) =
(b1(t1(ω)), . . . , bn(tn(ω))).10 A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE) is now a
profile b∗ = (b∗1, . . . , b∗n) of mixed strategies, one for each player i ∈ N , such that
i (b
∗
i (θi ), b
∗−i , θi ) ≥ i (bi (θi ), b∗−i , θi ), for any i ∈ N and θi ∈ i , and for any
mixed strategy bi for player i . A MSNE b∗ will be called degenerate if, for any i ∈ N
and θi ∈ i , the support of b∗i (θi ) is a singleton.
4 Existence
4.1 Assumptions
We start with the existence part. Two assumptions will be imposed. The first con-
cerns impact and cost functions and generalizes the corresponding assumption in
Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) in a straightforward way.
Assumption (A) For any i ∈ N and ω ∈ , the impact function fi,ω : R+ → R+
is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave. Further, for any i ∈ N and
ω ∈ , the cost function ci,ω : R+ → R+ is twice differentiable, strictly increasing,
and convex.
We have two remarks. First, the reader is cautioned that Assumption (A) imposes twice
differentiability of impact functions not only in the interior of the strategy space, but
also at the zero bid level.11 In particular, this point matters for the widely used impact
function fi,ω(x) = xr with r ∈ (0, 1), which is twice differentiable in the interior, but
not at the zero bid (where the impact function exhibits a vertical slope). However, in
many cases of interest, a simple change of variables, described already in Szidarovszky
and Okuguchi (1997), may be used to circumvent the problem. In our setting, this is
feasible when each type knows her impact function (i.e., when for any i ∈ N , and any
ω,ω′ ∈  such that ti (ω) = ti (ω′), we have fi,ω(·) = fi,ω′(·)). This is particularly
easy to see when, in addition, fi,ω(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N and ω ∈ .12 Then, each
player i ∈ N may be envisaged to choose directly the impact term yi = fi,ω(xi ) ≥ 0
rather than the bid xi ≥ 0. Since such a change of variables induces a one-to-one
10 The expectations exist provided that cost functions are bounded on compact intervals. In particular, this
is so under Assumption (A), which will be introduced in the next section.
11 As far as existence is concerned, twice differentiability of fi,ω at the zero bid could actually be replaced
by continuity at the zero bid without affecting the conclusions. However, twice differentiability of fi,ω at
the zero bid will be crucial in our proof of uniqueness, which is why we impose this assumption right from
the start.
12 The extension to the case where fi,ω(0) may be positive is straightforward.
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transformation of the respective sets of PSNE, and similarly for the respective sets of
MSNE, this approach may be employed to expand our results in a useful way and, in
particular, to deal with the Tullock example when r ∈ (0, 1).
More formally, one considers a transformed contest in which each player i ∈ N ,
after having received her signal θi = ti (ω) ∈ i in state ω ∈ , chooses yi ∈
[0, ymaxi (θi )] at costs c˜i,ω(yi ) = ci,ω( f −1i,ω (yi )), where the upper bound of the interval,
ymaxi (θi ) = fi,ω(xmaxi (θi )), is well defined as a result of our temporary assumption that
each type knows her impact function. Moreover, given a vector y = (y1, . . . , yn) such
that yi ∈ [0, ymaxi (θi )] for all i ∈ N , one specifies any player i’s ex post payoff at state
ω as
˜i,ω(y) = yiy1 + · · · + yn vi (ω) − c˜i,ω(yi ), (5)
where the ratio is interpreted as p0i,ω if the denominator vanishes. Then, the incomplete-
information contest and its transformed counterpart are strategically equivalent in
the sense that, for any i ∈ N , any ω ∈ , any x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+, and any
y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn+ such that yi = fi,ω(xi ) for all i ∈ N , we have that (i)
xi ∈ [0, xmaxi (ti (ω))] if and only if yi ∈ [0, ymaxi (ti (ω))], and (ii) ˜i,ω(y) = i,ω(x).
This construction will be illustrated with an example in Sect. 7.
Second, it should be clear that the simple assumptions on concavity and convexity
made in Assumption (A) are not crucial for the existence of a PSNE. This point has
been noted for contests with complete information (Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992;
Nti 1999; Cornes and Hartley 2005) and for contests with incomplete information
and discrete types (Malueg and Yates 2004). For continuous types and continuous
technologies, convexity assumptions may even be dropped entirely (Wasser 2013b).
However, it is also known that, in general, marginal conditions may fail to identify a
PSNE in a contest because global second-order conditions need not hold. Assump-
tion (A) excludes this possibility in a straightforward way.
It is fairly easy to see that Assumption (A) alone does not guarantee equilibrium
existence. For example, in a standard two-player Tullock contest with complete infor-
mation and p01 = p02 = 12 , there is no equilibrium, neither pure nor mixed, if precisely
one player has a positive budget.13 Thus, to deal with general cases in which zero bud-
gets may occur in states with discontinuous technologies, we need another assumption.
Assumption (B) For any i ∈ N and ω ∈  with xmaxi (ti (ω)) > 0, at least one of the
following two conditions holds true:
(i) The contest is continuous in ω;
(ii) There exists j ∈ N\{i} such that xmaxj (t j (ω)) > 0.
Assumption (B) requires that, in any state of the world in which the contest is discon-
tinuous, there is not precisely one contestant with a positive budget. This is a rather
mild restriction. For example, it holds when the contest is continuous in all states of
the world. Further, the assumption is satisfied when all players have a positive budget
in any state of the world.
13 As will be illustrated below, this problem does not go away when budgets are private information.
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4.2 Existence result
The first main result of this paper is the following.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions (A) and (B), there exists a PSNE in the incomplete-
information contest C.
Proof See the Appendix. unionsq
Theorem 1 is proved by means of a simple limit consideration. Specifically, suppose
that, for ε > 0 small (i.e., smaller than any positive budget), any type with a positive
budget is restricted to submitting a bid of at least ε. Then, given Assumption (A), a
standard result may be used to establish the existence of a PSNE in the contest with
minimum bid. Then, by letting ε go to zero, a sequence of strategy profiles may be
constructed that converges to a PSNE in the unrestricted contest, provided that the
limit strategy profile stays clear of the origin in any state of the world in which the
contest is discontinuous. But to see that the limit profile cannot be zero in such a
state, it suffices to note that, with Assumption (B) in place, the marginal incentive
to overbid for some endowed player exceeds any finite bound as ε → 0. Of course,
this conclusion is due to the nature of the discontinuous logit contest that, in terms of
marginal incentives, “explodes” for bid vectors that are close to the origin.
4.3 An example of nonexistence
We conclude this section with an example that shows that Assumption (B) cannot be
dropped from the statement of Theorem 1 even if budgets are private information.
Example 1 Consider a two-player lottery contest (i.e., a Tullock contest with parameter
r = 1). Each player has two equally likely types θL (low) and θH (high), and type
realizations are independent across players. Then, as illustrated in Fig. 1, the state
space,  = {ωLL, ωLH, ωHL, ωHH}, has four equally likely states, where the first
index of the state variable corresponds to player 1’s type (low or high), and the second
index to player 2’s type (likewise, low or high). In state ω ∈ , player i ∈ N = {1, 2}
wins with probability
pi,ω(x1, x2) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
xi
x1 + x2 if x1 + x2 > 0
p0i,ω if x1 + x2 = 0,
(6)
where p0i,ω ∈ [0, 1] satisfies p01,ω + p02,ω ≤ 1. Valuations are given by v1(ωLL) =
v1(ωLH) = v2(ωLL) = v2(ωHL) = V L and v1(ωHL) = v1(ωHH) = v2(ωLH) =
v2(ωHH) = V H, where V H > V L > 0. Finally, we assume cost functions ci,ω(xi ) =
xi , for any i ∈ N and ω ∈ . This game is known to admit a symmetric interior PSNE
with interesting properties (Malueg and Yates 2004; Fey 2008; Ludwig 2012).
We now introduce a budget constraint for player 2’s low type θL by assuming
xmax2 (θ
L) = 0, while the budgets of the other three types remain sufficiently large to
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Fig. 1 Information structure in Example 1
remain irrelevant. It is easy to see that Assumption (B) does not hold. Indeed, in state
ωLL, the technology is discontinuous while only player 1 has a positive budget. It is
claimed now that there is no PSNE in the parameter domain where V H ≥ 4V L and
p01,ωLL < 1. To see this, suppose that an equilibrium is given by bids x
L
1 , x
H
1 , x
L
2 , and
xH2 , where necessarily x
L
2 = 0. We start by showing that xH2 , xL1 , and xH1 are all interior,
and consequently satisfy the necessary first-order conditions for an interior optimum.
Indeed, if we had xH2 = 0, then type θL of player 1 would have no best response since
p01,ωLL < 1. Hence, x
H
2 > 0, and
1
2
xL1
(
xH2 + xL1
)2 +
1
2
xH1
(
xH2 + xH1
)2 =
1
V H
(7)
holds true. Next, given xL2 = 0 and p01,ωLL < 1, the best response of player 1’s type
θL must be positive, i.e., we have xL1 > 0, with
1
2
xH2
(
xL1 + xH2
)2 =
1
V L
. (8)
Finally, since player 1’s best response (if well defined) is monotone increasing in her
valuation, one obtains xH1 > 0, so that
1
2
xH2
(
xH1 + xH2
)2 =
1
V H
. (9)
Solving now (8) and (9) for xL1 and xH1 , respectively, yields
xL1 =
√
xH2 V L
2
− xH2 , and (10)
xH1 =
√
xH2 V H
2
− xH2 . (11)
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Plugging these expressions into (7), and simplifying, we arrive at
xH2 =
V L
2
(
1 +
√
V L
V H
)2
(
1 + 2 V
L
V H
)2 . (12)
But from xL1 > 0 and (10), we get xH2 < V L/2, which is in conflict with (12) if
V L/V H ≤ 1/4. Thus, unless player 1 wins the prize for sure in state ωLL in the case
of joint inactivity, there is indeed no PSNE.14
Example 1 may be “repaired” by assuming that the endowed player wins with prob-
ability one in the case of joint inactivity. Then, in equilibrium, xL1 = 0 and the high
types bid xH1 = xH2 = V H/8, which is just half of the expenditure in the corresponding
contest with complete information. This trick may actually be generalized. Indeed, as
can be checked, the proof of Theorem 1 continues to go through when we add “(iii)
p0i,ω = 1” as a third alternative in Assumption (B). Then, it is easy to see that this
relaxed variant of Assumption (B) can always be satisfied by modifying the relevant
parameters, so that any player that is the only one having a positive budget in some
state wins the contest in that state with certainty in the case of joint inactivity. In other
words, Assumption (B) may be entirely dropped when one is willing to endogenize
the sharing rule at the origin.
5 Uniqueness
5.1 Assumptions
As has been noted in prior work (e.g., Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier 1992; Cornes and
Hartley 2005), standard concavity and convexity assumptions may be crucial for the
uniqueness of PSNE in contests even under the assumption of complete information.
Since we do not know of any general reason why asymmetric information should
render uniqueness more likely in the present setup, we will keep Assumption (A). In
addition, we will impose the following assumption on the information structure.
Assumption (C) There is a mapping v :  → R++ ≡ (0,∞) and, for each i ∈ N , a
mapping κi : i → R++, such that vi (ω) = v(ω) · κi (ti (ω)) for any ω ∈ .
Assumption (C) requires that valuations can be expressed as a product of a common-
value component (that may depend on the state, yet not on the player’s identity) and
a private-value component (that may depend on a player’s identity and type, yet not
directly on the state).15 The condition subsumes a large variety of commonly used
information structures.
14 In fact, as will be discussed at the end of the next section, there is no MSNE either.
15 For instance, when several firms i = 1, . . . , n exploit a natural resource, the common factor v(·)
might correspond to the total yield, while κi (ti (·)) might correspond to firm i’s profitability. Note also that
Assumption (C) holds trivially under complete information.
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(a) Independent private valuations In this setting, the common-value component is
trivial, i.e., v(ω) = 1 for any ω ∈ , and valuations are stochastically independent
across players. This setting clearly fulfills Assumption (C).
(b) Correlated private values In straightforward extension of the previous case,
Assumption (C) is satisfied in settings in which each player knows her valuation at
the time of bidding while valuations are not stochastically independent across players.
Even the limit case of perfect correlation is covered, provided that zero-probability
states are eliminated from the state space.
(c) Pure common values In still another setting, players share a common ex post val-
uation of the prize (e.g., because there is the possibility of resale), but players receive
idiosyncratic signals. Thus, there is incomplete and potentially asymmetric informa-
tion about the common valuation of the prize at the time of bidding. Assumption (C)
holds because the private-value components may be set to one, i.e., κi (θi ) = 1 for any
i ∈ N and θi ∈ i .
(d) Interdependent valuations The case of interdependent valuations is consistent with
Assumption (C), as Example 2A illustrates.
Example 2A Assume that v1 = θ1+αθ2 and v2 = θ2+αθ1, with θ1 and θ2 independent,
and α > 0 fixed. Provided that each player i ∈ N = {1, 2} has only two feasible type
realizations θH and θL with θH > θL > 0, Assumption (C) is satisfied. To see this,
set the common-value component equal to
v(ω) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if t1(ω) = t2(ω)
(1 + α)θH
θH + αθL if t1(ω) = t2(ω) = θ
H
(1 + α)θL
θL + αθH if t1(ω) = t2(ω) = θ
L
,
(13)
and the private-value components equal to
κi (θi ) =
{
θL + αθH if θi = θL
θH + αθL if θi = θH. (14)
Then, it can be checked in a straightforward way that vi (ω) = v(ω) · κi (ti (ω)) for any
i ∈ N and ω ∈ , as claimed.
However, as our next example shows, there are also settings that are not consistent
with Assumption (C).
Example 2B Consider a variation of the previous example in which each of the two
players has three feasible type realizations θH, θM, and θL, with θH > θM > θL > 0.
Then, Assumption (C) implies κ1(θ1) = κ2(θ2) if θ1 = θ2.16 Moreover, dropping the
superfluous index from κi ,
θH + αθL
θL + αθH =
κ(θH)
κ(θL)
= κ(θ
H)/κ(θM)
κ(θL)/κ(θM)
= (θ
H + αθM)(θM + αθL)
(θM + αθH)(θL + αθM) , (15)
16 Indeed, from Assumption (C), v1(ω) = v(ω) · κ1(θ1) and v2(ω) = v(ω) · κ2(θ2). But if θ1 = θ2, then
v1(ω) = (1 + α)θ1 = (1 + α)θ2 = v2(ω). Hence, κ1(θ1) = κ2(θ2), as claimed.
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which shows that Assumption (C) indeed fails to hold for any generic specification of
the parameters. Similarly, with n > 2 players, each of which has at least two feasible
type realizations, and vi = θi +α∑k =iθk , it is easy to see that Assumption (C) cannot
be satisfied if α > 0 and α = 1, because the ratio vi/v j , for j = i , will then depend
on some θk with k = i and k = j .
5.2 The uniqueness result
The second main result of the present paper is the following.
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions (A) and (C), there exists at most one PSNE in the
incomplete-information contest C . Moreover, there are no nondegenerate MSNE.
Proof See the Appendix. unionsq
The proof of the first part of Theorem 2 is long and complicated. This is so because,
as discussed in the Introduction, the methods introduced by Rosen (1965), Goodman
(1980), and Ui (2008) need to be extended to deal with the case of discontinuous
contests of the logit form. The following outline provides an overview of the proof.
We start by noting that it suffices to prove the claim under the assumption of
pure common values. Indeed, as can be checked, any incomplete-information contest
satisfying Assumption (C) can be recast, via a simple rescaling of payoffs, as a contest
with pure common values. Then, to provoke a contradiction, we assume the existence
of two distinct equilibria β∗ and β∗∗, and consider the inner product of the vector
β∗−β∗∗ with the payoff gradient in the agent normal form, where we replace any type’s
marginal payoff by zero whenever her budget is zero. See also Fig. 2, which illustrates
both the hypothetical vector β∗ − β∗∗ and the concept of the payoff gradient.17 As
a consequence of the Kuhn–Tucker conditions for payoff maximization, the inner
product is zero or positive at β∗, and zero or negative at β∗∗.
To obtain a contradiction, we consider the straight path βs that connects β0 = β∗∗
with β1 = β∗ (see again Fig. 2 for illustration) and claim that the derivative of
the inner product at βs with respect to s is negative. Now, the convexity of cost
functions implies an upper bound for that derivative in terms of the Jacobian Jp,ω of
the vector of marginal probabilities of winning at state ω. Moreover, this upper bound
is negative if the matrix sum Jp,ω + J Tp,ω is (i) negative semi-definite in all states
of the world, and (ii) negative definite in at least one state ω0 in which β∗ and β∗∗
differ. To verify these conditions, we extend Goodman’s (1980) sufficient conditions
by distinguishing between arbitrary nonzero bid profiles (for which Jp,ω + J Tp,ω can
merely be shown to be negative semi-definite), and bid profiles that possess at least
two nonzero components (for which Jp,ω + J Tp,ω can actually be shown to be negative
definite). We then prove the existence of a state ω0 such that βs(t(ω0)) has at least
two nonzero components for any s ∈ (0, 1), while β∗ and β∗∗ differ at ω0. Combining
these observations, we can finally put a negative sign on the derivative of the inner
product, and thereby obtain the desired contradiction.
17 The figure shows the gradient field for a two-player Tullock contest with heterogeneous valuations and
positive budgets. For reasons of dimensionality, the example assumes complete information. Moreover,
given the singularity at the origin, the gradient field has been normalized.
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Fig. 2 Illustration of the uniqueness proof
The second part of Theorem 2 says that there cannot exist any Nash equilibrium in
nondegenerate mixed strategies. This is more or less an immediate consequence of
Assumption (A).18 Indeed, if type θi expects, with positive probability, a positive bid
of at least one opponent, then her payoff function is strictly concave. If, however, type
θi expects that all other players remain inactive with probability one, then her payoff
function is strictly declining in the interior, which still implies strict quasiconcavity
because pi,ω ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Pi (θi ). It follows that any Nash equilibrium in the agent
normal form must indeed be in pure strategies.19
6 Symmetric contests
Additional results can be obtained for symmetric contests. For this, consider an
incomplete-information contest C with state space  = 1 × · · · × n , where we
assume 1 = · · · = n , and where ti :  → i is the projection on the i-th com-
ponent, for any i ∈ N . Fix a permutation of the player set, i.e., a one-to-one mapping
π : N → N . Then, or any state ω = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ , let ωπ = (θπ(1), . . . , θπ(n)),
so that in state ωπ , the type of player i is ti (ωπ) = tπ(i)(ω) = θπ(i). Similarly, for
any profile of bids x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+, let xπ = (xπ(1), . . . , xπ(n)), so that
in the profile xπ , player i chooses the bid xπ(i). To define a symmetric contest, we
will require that the primitives of the contest remain invariant under arbitrary per-
mutations of the player set. Formally, an incomplete-information contest C as just
introduced will be called symmetric if, for any i ∈ N , any ω ∈ , and any per-
mutation π , it holds that q(ωπ) = q(ω), fi,ωπ (·) = fπ(i),ω(·), p0i,ωπ = p0π(i),ω,
vi (ω
π) = vπ(i)(ω), ci,ωπ (·) = cπ(i),ω(·), and xmaxi (·) = xmaxπ(i)(·) As detailed in the
18 In fact, Assumption (C) is not needed for this conclusion.
19 If the contest is continuous in all states of the world, then the second part of Theorem 2 may be derived
alternatively by combining Lemma A.5 in the Appendix with Ui (2008, Cor. 6). However, that alternative
proof does not go through under the more general assumptions of Theorem 2.
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Appendix, these conditions jointly ensure that any symmetric contest of incomplete
information is a symmetric n-player game.
Suppose that C is a symmetric incomplete-information contest. Let ω# ∈  be a
state and i ∈ N be a player with positive budget in ω#, i.e., xmaxi (ti (ω#)) > 0. We
will say that ω# is activity-inducing for i if (ı) the contest is discontinuous in ω#, (ıı)
there is at least one other player j ∈ N\{i} with a positive budget at ω#, and (ııı) any
player k ∈ N\{i} with a positive budget at ω# is of the same type as i .20 The following
condition is a variant of Assumption (B) for symmetric contests.
Assumption (B’) For any ω ∈  and i ∈ N such that xmaxi (ti (ω)) > 0, at least one of
the following three conditions holds true:
(i) The contest is continuous in ω;
(ii) There exists j ∈ N\{i} such that xmaxj (t j (ω)) > 0;
(iii) There exists a state ω# ∈ Pi (ti (ω)) that is activity-inducing for i .
Note that conditions (i) and (ii) are identical to those stated in Assumption (B). Hence,
Assumption (B’) relaxes Assumption (B) in the sense that we may actually have a state
ω ∈  in which both the contest is discontinuous and precisely one player i ∈ N has
a positive budget, provided that player i in state ω considers possible a (necessarily
different) state ω# ∈  that is activity-inducing for i .
Let C be a symmetric incomplete-information contest, as before. Then a profile of
bid schedules β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ B will be called symmetric if β1 = · · · = βn . The
following theorem is the third and final main result of the present paper.
Theorem 3 Consider a symmetric incomplete-information contest C. Then, given
Assumptions (A) and (B’), there exists a symmetric PSNE in C. If, in addition, Assump-
tion (C) holds, then the symmetric equilibrium is the unique PSNE.
Proof See the Appendix. unionsq
Thus, the assumptions for PSNE existence may indeed be relaxed in a symmetric
contest. The idea of the proof should be clear by now. Should there be a state ω ∈ 
in which the contest is discontinuous and in which only one player i ∈ N has a
positive budget, then Assumption (B’) guarantees that this player deems possible a
state ω# ∈  at which all the endowed players (of which there are at least two) are
in exactly the same strategic situation. Therefore, in state ω#, all the endowed players
choose the same bid in any symmetric PSNE of the contest with minimum bid. Given
that the contest is discontinuous in ω#, this common bid level (used also by player i at
state ω) remains bounded away from zero even when the minimum bid goes to zero.
Hence, any limit profile of PSNE in the contests with minimum bid is a PSNE in the
original contest.
It may be noted that it is really the symmetry of the contest that is crucial for the
existence conclusion in Theorem 3, rather than the underlying information structure.
Indeed, Example 1 assumes that  = 1 × 2 with 1 = 2, and that ti :  → i
is the projection on the i-th component, for any i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, the information
20 In particular, condition (ııı) implies that players i and j are of the same type.
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structure assumed in Example 1 is as required by Theorem 3. However, the symmetry
condition xmax1 (θL) = xmax2 (θL) fails to hold, so that the contest is not symmetric.
And indeed, as has been discussed, there may be no equilibrium in that contest.
The following example illustrates the usefulness of Theorem 3.
Example 3 We modify Example 1 by assuming that the budgets of the low types are
given by xmax1 (θL) = xmax2 (θL) = 0, while the budgets of the high types remain as
large as before. Then, Assumption (B) does not hold because in state ωHL, for instance,
only player 1 has a positive budget. However, in contrast to Example 1, there is no
problem with existence here because the contest is symmetric and Assumption (B’)
holds. Indeed, ωHH ∈ P1(θH) ∩ P2(θH) is activity-inducing for both players, and
hence, there is a symmetric PSNE (where xH1 = xH2 = V H/8).
7 Applications
This section reviews a number of specific settings in which Theorems 1 through 3
allow drawing new conclusions.
7.1 Equilibria at the boundary
Hurley and Shogren (1998b) consider a two-player lottery contest with two types
for one player and three types for the other player. They show that there is at most
one interior PSNE. However, since their setting is one of private valuations (either
independent or correlated), it follows from Theorems 1 and 2 that there is, in fact,
exactly one PSNE. That equilibrium may be interior, but it may likewise be located
at the boundary, as it happens, e.g., when low-valuation types submit zero bids in
anticipation of aggressive bidding by the opponent. Thus, our results imply uniqueness
regardless of boundary considerations.
7.2 Asymmetric equilibria
An immediate consequence of the uniqueness result is that a symmetric contest satisfy-
ing Assumptions (A) and (C) does not admit any asymmetric equilibrium. Consider, for
instance, the model of Malueg and Yates (2004), where each contestant i ∈ N = {1, 2}
has the state-independent probability of winning
pi (x1, x2) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(xi )
r
(x1)r + (x2)r if x1 + x2 > 0
p0i ≡ 12 if x1 + x2 = 0,
(16)
for some exogenous parameter r > 0, while cost functions are linear, i.e., ci (xi ) = xi .
The state space is as in Example 1, but probabilities are now given by q(ωLL) =
q(ωHH) = σ2 and q(ωLH) = q(ωHL) = 1−σ2 , where σ ∈ [0, 1] is a correlation
parameter. Malueg and Yates (2004) derive conditions necessary and sufficient for
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the existence of precisely one symmetric PSNE and show that these conditions hold,
in particular, for r ∈ (0, 1]. We may now refer to the discussion of the cases of
independent and correlated private values following Theorem 2 to conclude that there
is no asymmetric PSNE (nor MSNE) for r = 1. There is likewise no asymmetric
equilibrium for r ∈ (0, 1), since in this case, as discussed, a change of variables
transforms the Tullock contest into a strategically equivalent lottery contest with state-
independent cost functions c˜i (yi ) = (yi )1/r , to which our argument for r = 1 extends
in a straightforward way.
7.3 Population uncertainty
In a contest with population uncertainty, the number of players entering the con-
test follows some exogenous probability distribution.21 Münster (2006), for example,
characterizes the symmetric PSNE in a model with finitely many contestants each of
which independently draws a zero or positive valuation. Strictly speaking, that setup
does not satisfy our assumptions because there are states of the world in which not all
players have a positive valuation. However, as discussed in Münster (2006, p. 355), it
is inessential for the equilibrium analysis if inactivity is modeled as a lack of motiva-
tion (i.e., a zero valuation) or as a lack of endowment (i.e., a zero budget). Therefore,
one may easily come up with an equivalent setup that satisfies the assumptions of
Theorem 3. Thus, we have a unique PSNE. In fact, this conclusion remains true if
stochastic participation is not necessarily independent across players.
7.4 Contests with resale
Sui (2009) considers contests with the possibility of resale. In substance, this means
that a winner with low valuation V L may offer the prize to the loser at price (marginally
below) V H > V L, who will accept if and only if her valuation is V H. Strictly speaking,
Sui (2009) proves neither existence nor uniqueness.22 To apply Theorems 1 and 2, one
notes that, in terms of continuation payoffs, winning is worth V L if both players have
a low valuation, and V H otherwise. In other words, the possibility of resale creates a
contest of pure common values. We conclude that there is indeed a unique PSNE in
the reduced form of Sui’s game.
8 Concluding remarks
As the preceding illustrations may have shown, the main results of the present paper
provide a simple set of conditions sufficient for the existence of a unique PSNE in
incomplete-information contests with or without budget constraints. While some of
21 Depending on the setup, the set of potential entrants may be finite (Münster 2006; Lagerlöf 2007; Lim
and Matros 2009; Fu et al. 2011) or infinite (Myerson and Wärneryd 2006; Kahana and Klunover 2015).
22 Instead, he shows that any symmetric PSNE, if it exists, satisfies a system of two equations (which,
in principle, might have several solutions or no solution, even if players’ objective functions are globally
concave).
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our assumptions could probably be further relaxed, the conditions are certainly general
enough to deal with most applications that assume a discrete information structure.23
The analysis allows drawing potentially useful conclusions also regarding the
expected net rent in rent-seeking games of incomplete information. To see why, note
that for any active type θi , i.e., for any type that chooses a positive bid, there is a state
ω ∈ Pi (θi ) in which either the technology is continuous, or in which the technology
is discontinuous but some player j = i is active in ω. Either way, θi ’s expected payoff
is a strictly concave function of her own expenditure. Hence, noting that inactivity
generates a (normalized) payoff of zero, equilibrium activity must yield a positive
payoff. Thus, any player that is active with positive probability will realize a positive
expected net rent.
An important problem for future work is comparative statics. Comparative statics
for contests has been exhaustively studied in the case of complete information (see, e.g.,
Jensen 2016) and in the case of one-sided incomplete information (Hurley and Shogren
1998a). For two-sided asymmetric information, however, there are multiple effects that
are not straightforward to disentangle (Hurley and Shogren 1998b). Consequently,
it is not surprising that topics such as learning in contests (Pogrebna 2008; Aoyagi
2010), optimal bias (Drugov and Ryvkin 2017), approximate solutions (Gallice 2017),
endogenous timing with asymmetric information (Fu 2006), transparency (Denter et al.
2011), the implications of changes to the information structure (Serena 2014; Denter
and Sisak 2015), and information transmission (Slantchev 2010; Kovenock et al. 2015;
Zhang and Zhou 2016) have recently become very active fields of research.
There are several dimensions in which the present analysis could be usefully
extended. For instance, we did not consider productive effort (Chung 1996; Chowd-
hury and Sheremeta 2011; Hirai and Szidarovszky 2013), nor group contests (Fu et al.
2015; Brookins and Ryvkin 2016).24 Some generalization would be desirable also
for the existence part. So far, the direct application of Reny’s theorem to incomplete-
information contests has primarily been an expositional alternative. However, new
results of practical relevance for contest theory might be feasible by combining argu-
ments specific to contests with the insights of the more recent literature on equilibrium
existence in discontinuous games (e.g., Carbonell-Nicolau and McLean 2017; He and
Yannelis 2015, 2016).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix. Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 3. The proofs are based
on altogether eight lemmas. Lemma A.1 is used in the proof of Theorems 1 and 3,
23 However, the general analysis of uniqueness for contests with interdependent valuations remains an
open issue.
24 Very recently, Xu et al. (2019) have applied the methods of the present paper to networks of contests.
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while Lemma A.2 is used in the proof of Theorem 2. Lemmas A.3 through A.7 enter
the proof of Lemma A.2 (where the use of Lemma A.5 is indirect via Lemma A.4).
Lemma A.8, finally, is employed in the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ε > 0 be small enough such that ε < xmaxi (θi ) for any i ∈ N
and θi ∈ i with xmaxi (θi ) > 0. Then, for any ε ∈ (0, ε), restricting the choice of any
type θi ∈ i with xmaxi (θi ) > 0 to [ε, xmaxi (θi )], for any i ∈ N , defines the contest with
minimum bid, C(ε). By Assumption (A), type θi ’s expected payoff in C(ε) is concave
in her own bid, as well as continuous in the profile of bid schedules. Hence, by the
Nikaidô and Isoda (1955) theorem, a PSNE exists in the agent normal form of C(ε).
Fix now a sequence {εm}∞m=1 in (0, ε) with limm→∞ εm = 0, and select a PSNE βm
in C(εm), for each m ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. Since B, as defined in Sect. 3, is a compact subset
of Euclidean space, we may assume w.l.o.g. that the sequence {βm}∞m=1 converges to
some profile of bid schedules β∗ ∈ B. We claim that β∗ is a PSNE in the original
contest C. For this, take any i ∈ N and θi ∈ i such that xmaxi (θi ) > 0, and consider
a deviation xi ∈ [0, xmaxi (θi )].
Case 1. Suppose first that xi > 0. Then, for any m sufficiently large, xi ≥ εm , so
that, by the optimality of type θi ’s bid βmi (θi ) in C(εm),
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )i,ω(βmi (θi ), βm−i (t−i (ω)))
≥
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )i,ω(xi , βm−i (t−i (ω))). (17)
Fix any ω ∈ Pi (θi ). By Assumption (B), either (i) the contest is continuous in ω, or
(ii) there exists j ∈ N\{i} such that xmaxj (t j (ω)) > 0. In case (i), the function i,ω(·)
is continuous at β∗(t(ω)) by Assumption (A). In case (ii), we may assume w.l.o.g. that
the contest is discontinuous in ω. But then, Lemma A.1 implies that β∗(t(ω)) = 0,
so that i,ω(·) is likewise continuous at β∗(t(ω)). Recalling that xi > 0, and letting
m → ∞ in (17) yields i (β∗i (θi ), β∗−i , θi ) ≥ i (xi , β∗−i , θi ), i.e., xi is not a profitable
deviation for θi .
Case 2. Suppose next that xi = 0. Clearly, for any small but positive δ > 0,
i (β
∗
i (θi ), β
∗−i , θi ) ≥ i (δ, β∗−i , θi ), (18)
as just seen. But since pi,ω(·, x−i ) is nondecreasing for any ω ∈  and x−i ∈ Rn−1+ ,
we obtain the lower bound
i (δ, β
∗−i , θi ) ≥ i (0, β∗−i , θi ) − E
[
ci,ω(δ)
] + E [ci,ω(0)
]
, (19)
where expectations are taken with respect to qi (·|θi ). Combining inequalities (18) and
(19), and subsequently letting δ → 0, the continuity of cost functions implies that
i (β
∗
i (θi ), β
∗−i , θi ) ≥ i (0, β∗−i , θi ). Thus, a deviation to xi = 0 is not profitable
either.
In sum, type θi has no profitable deviation. Since i ∈ N and θi ∈ i with xmaxi (θi ) > 0
were arbitrary, β∗ is indeed a PSNE in C. unionsq
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The following lemma reflects the key intuition underlying the existence argument.
Since the lemma will be used also in the proof of Theorem 3, we remark that its proof
does not make use of Assumption (B).
Lemma A.1 Let ω ∈  and players i, j ∈ N with i = j such that xmaxi (ti (ω)) > 0
and xmaxj (t j (ω)) > 0. If the contest is discontinuous in ω, then β∗(t(ω)) = 0.
Proof Clearly, pi,ω(βm(t(ω))) + p j,ω(βm(t(ω))) ≤ 1 for any m. Hence, possibly
after exchanging i and j , we have that pi,ω(βm(t(ω))) ≤ 12 holds for infinitely many
m. By transition to a suitable subsequence, we may assume w.l.o.g. that this is true for
any m. But then,
∂ pi,ω(βm(t(ω)))
∂xi
= ∂ fi,ω(β
m
i (ti (ω)))/∂xi
f1,ω(βm1 (t1(ω))) + · · · + fn,ω(βmn (tn(ω)))
· (1 − pi,ω(βm(t(ω))))
(20)
≥ ∂ fi,ω(β
m
i (ti (ω)))/∂xi
f1,ω(βm1 (t1(ω))) + · · · + fn,ω(βmn (tn(ω)))
· 1
2
, (21)
for any m. To provoke a contradiction, suppose now that limm→∞ βm(t(ω)) = 0. Then,
taking into account that ∂ fi,ω(0)/∂xi > 0, the RHS of inequality (21) tends to infinity
as m → ∞. Therefore, for type θi = ti (ω), positive valuations and bounded marginal
costs imply that ∂i (βmi (θi ), β
m
−i , θi )/∂xi > 0 holds for any sufficiently large m.
For any such m, the necessary Kuhn–Tucker conditions imply βmi (θi ) = xmaxi (θi ), in
conflict with limm→∞ βmi (θi ) = 0. The lemma follows. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2. We show first that there is at most one PSNE. Let i ∈ N and
θi ∈ i . Then, by Assumption (C), maximizing θi ’s expected payoff
i (xi , β−i , θi ) =
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )
{
pi,ω(xi , β−i (t−i (ω)))vi (ω) − ci,ω(xi )
} (22)
is equivalent to maximizing θi ’s expected payoff in units of her private-valuation
component, κi (θi ) > 0. Formally,
i (xi , β−i , θi )
κi (θi )
=
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )
(
pi,ω(xi , β−i (t−i (ω)))v(ω) − ci,ω(xi )
κi (ti (ω))
)
. (23)
Thus, a normalized contest Ĉ, strategically equivalent to C, may be characterized by
valuations v̂i (ω) = v(ω) and cost functions ĉi,ω(xi ) = ci,ω(xi )/κi (ti (ω)). Clearly, Ĉ
is a contest with a pure common valuation that satisfies Assumption (A). Therefore,
by Lemma A.2, there is at most one PSNE in Ĉ. It follows that there is indeed at most
one PSNE in C. To prove the second claim, let b∗ = (b∗1, . . . , b∗n) be a MSNE in C.
Fix i ∈ N and θi ∈ i . Then θi ’s expected payoff from a bid xi ≥ 0 is given by
i (xi , b
∗−i , θi ) =
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )Eb∗−i (t−i (ω))
[
i,ω(xi , x−i )
]
, (24)
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where the expectation in state ω is taken over the realizations of x−i according to the
product measure b∗−i (t−i (ω)) = {b∗j (t j (ω))} j =i . By Assumption (A), i,ω(·, x−i ) is
concave for any x−i ∈ Rn−1+ , and even strictly so if x−i = 0. Therefore, if for some
ω ∈ Pi (θi ) and j ∈ N\{i}, the support of b∗j (t j (ω)) contains a positive bid, then
the mapping xi → i (xi , b∗−i , θi ) is strictly concave on R+. Hence, the probability
distribution b∗i (θi ) must be degenerate. If, however, for any ω ∈ Pi (θi ) and j ∈ N\{i},
the probability measure b∗j (t j (ω)) assigns all probability mass to the zero bid, then
xi → i (xi , b∗−i , θi ) is, after a potential upward jump at the zero bid, strictly declining
in the interior by Assumption (A). Thus, also in this case, b∗i (θi ) must be degenerate.
Since i ∈ N and θi ∈ i were arbitrary, this proves the second claim. The theorem
follows. unionsq
The lemma below deals with the case of a pure common valuation.
Lemma A.2 If κi (θi ) = 1 for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ i , then there is at most one PSNE.
Proof Suppose there are PSNE β∗ and β∗∗, with β∗ = β∗∗. Consider the straight path
βs = sβ∗ + (1 − s)β∗∗, where s ∈ [0, 1]. Then, as illustrated in Fig. 2, β0 = β∗∗
and β1 = β∗. Let i ∈ N and θi ∈ i . Then, by Lemma A.3, we may define type θi ’s
“marginal interim payoff” at the strategy profile βs as
π i (s, θi ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂i (β
s
i (θi ), β
s
−i , θi )
∂xi
if xmaxi (θi ) > 0
0 if xmaxi (θi ) = 0.
(25)
Consider now the inner product
γs =
n∑
i=1
∑
θi ∈i
qi (θi ){β∗i (θi ) − β∗∗i (θi )}π i (s, θi ). (26)
Then, at s = 0, the necessary Kuhn–Tucker conditions for type θi at the equilibrium
β0 = β∗∗ imply β∗∗i (θi ) = 0 if π i (0, θi ) < 0, and β∗∗i (θi ) = xmaxi (θi ) if π i (0, θi ) >
0. It follows that γ0 ≤ 0. Similarly, the necessary Kuhn–Tucker conditions at the
equilibrium β1 = β∗ imply that γ1 ≥ 0. To provoke a contradiction, we will now
show that γs is strictly declining over the interval [0, 1]. Combining Eq. (25) with (37)
from Lemma A.3 delivers
π i (s, θi ) =
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )πi,ω(s), (27)
where player i’s “marginal ex post payoff” at state ω is given by
πi,ω(s) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∂i,ω(β
s(t(ω)))
∂xi
if xmaxi (ti (ω)) > 0
0 if xmaxi (ti (ω)) = 0.
(28)
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Plugging (27) into (26), and exploiting that ω ∈ Pi (θi ) implies qi (θi )qi (ω|θi ) = q(ω),
we find that
γs =
n∑
i=1
∑
θi ∈i
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
q(ω){β∗i (θi ) − β∗∗i (θi )}πi,ω(s). (29)
Since player i’s possibility sets Pi (θi ), for signals θi ranging over the type space i ,
form a partition of the state space , this may be written more compactly as
γs =
n∑
i=1
∑
ω∈
q(ω)zi (ω)πi,ω(s), (30)
where zi (ω) = β∗i (ti (ω)) − β∗∗i (ti (ω)). Fix i ∈ N and ω ∈  for the moment. We
claim that πi,ω(·) is differentiable. It should be clear that, to prove the claim, we may
assume w.l.o.g. that (i) xmaxi (ti (ω)) > 0, (ii) the contest is discontinuous in ω, and (iii)
β∗(t(ω)) = 0 or β∗∗(t(ω)) = 0. But under these conditions, since p01,ω+· · ·+ p0n,ω ≤
1, player i is the only player with a positive budget at ω. Moreover, p0i,ω = 1. Therefore,
i,ω(xi , β
s
−i (t(ω))) = vi (ω) − ci,ω(xi ), so that πi,ω(s) = −∂ci,ω(βsi (t(ω)))/∂xi is
indeed differentiable. It follows that (30) is differentiable as well, with
∂γs
∂s
=
n∑
i=1
∑
ω∈
q(ω)zi (ω)
∂πi,ω(s)
∂s
. (31)
To determine the sign of (31), fix some i ∈ N and ω ∈ . If xmaxi (ti (ω)) > 0, then
πi,ω(s) = vi (ω)∂ pi,ω(β
s
1(t1(ω)), . . . , β
s
n(tn(ω)))
∂xi
− ∂ci,ω(β
s
i (ti (ω)))
∂xi
, (32)
and an application of the chain rule for differentiation, using βsj (t j (ω)) = β∗∗j (t j (ω))+
s · z j (ω) for j ∈ N , leads to
∂πi,ω(s)
∂s
= vi (ω)
n∑
j=1
∂2 pi,ω(βs1(t1(ω)), . . . , β
s
n(tn(ω)))
∂x j∂xi
z j (ω)
− ∂
2ci,ω(β
s
i (ti (ω)))
∂x2i
zi (ω). (33)
Multiplying Eq. (33) through with zi (ω), and subsequently exploiting the convexity
of cost functions, one obtains
zi (ω)
∂πi,ω(s)
∂s
≤ vi (ω)
n∑
j=1
∂2 pi,ω(βs(t(ω)))
∂x j∂xi
zi (ω)z j (ω). (34)
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If, however, xmaxi (ti (ω)) = 0, then zi (ω) = β∗∗i (ti (ω)) − β∗i (ti (ω)) = 0, and (34)
is likewise satisfied. Thus, (34) holds for any i ∈ N and ω ∈ . Combining the
inequality with (31), and exploiting that vi (·) = v(·) for any i ∈ N , one arrives at
∂γs
∂s
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
ω∈
q(ω)vi (ω)
n∑
j=1
∂2 pi,ω(βs(t(ω)))
∂x j∂xi
zi (ω)z j (ω) (35)
=
∑
ω∈
q(ω)v(ω)z(ω)T Jp,ω(βs(t(ω)))z(ω), (36)
where z(ω) = (z1(ω), . . . , zn(ω))T , and Jp,ω(x) is the n × n-matrix whose element
at the intersection of row i ∈ N and column j ∈ N is ∂2 pi,ω(x)/∂x j∂xi . Since
we know that γs is (differentiable, hence) continuous on [0, 1], it suffices to show
that the right-hand side of (36) is negative for any s ∈ (0, 1). So assume that s ∈
(0, 1). Let 0 = {ω ∈  : z(ω) = 0} denote the set of states at which β∗ and β∗∗
differ. Then, for any ω ∈ 0, we clearly have βs(t(ω)) = 0. Hence, by Lemma A.4,
Jp,ω(βs(t(ω))) + Jp,ω(βs(t(ω)))T is negative semi-definite for any ω ∈ 0. Thus,
using Lemma A.6, z(ω)T Jp,ω(βs(t(ω)))z(ω) ≤ 0, for any ω ∈ 0. Moreover, by
Lemma A.7, there is a state ω0 ∈ 0 such that the bid profile βs(t(ω0)) ∈ Rn+ has at
least two nonzero components. Thus, using the strict versions of Lemmas A.4 and A.6,
the right-hand side of (36) is indeed seen to be negative. unionsq
The lemma below is concerned with the differentiability of interim expected payoffs.
Lemma A.3 If xmaxi (θi ) > 0, then the function xi → i (xi , βs−i , θi ) is differentiable
at xi = βsi (θi ) for any s ∈ [0, 1], with
∂i (β
s
i (θi ), β
s
−i , θi )
∂xi
=
∑
ω∈Pi (θi )
qi (ω|θi )
∂i,ω(β
s
i (θi ), β
s
−i (t−i (ω)))
∂xi
. (37)
Proof Take some s ∈ [0, 1]. In view of Eq. (3), it suffices to show that
i,ω(xi , β
s
−i (t−i (ω))) is differentiable at xi = βsi (θi ), for any ω ∈ Pi (θi ). So let
ω ∈ Pi (θi ). To provoke a contradiction, suppose that ∂i,ω(βs(t(ω)))/∂xi does not
exist. Then, necessarily, βs(t(ω)) = 0. Moreover, f1,ω(0) + · · · + fn,ω(0) = 0, and
p0i,ω < 1. Assume first that s = 1, so that βs = β∗ and, hence, β∗(t(ω)) = 0. Then,
since xmaxi (θi ) > 0, type θi ’s inactivity cannot be optimal by the usual discontinuity
argument. Assume next that s < 1. Then βs(t(ω)) = 0 implies β∗∗(t(ω)) = 0, which
is likewise impossible. This proves the lemma. unionsq
The next lemma extends Goodman’s (1980) argument.
Lemma A.4 For any ω ∈ , the matrix Jp,ω(x) + Jp,ω(x)T is negative semi-definite
for any bid profile x ∈ Rn+\{0}, and negative definite for any bid profile x ∈ Rn+
possessing at least two nonzero components.
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Proof Take any ω ∈  and x ∈ Rn+\{0}. We wish to show that the matrix sum
Jp,ω(x) + Jp,ω(x)T
=
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
2 ∂
2 p1,ω(x)
∂x21
∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂x2∂x1
+ ∂2 p2,ω(x)
∂x1∂x2
· · · ∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂xn∂x1
+ ∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂x1∂xn
∂2 p2,ω(x)
∂x1∂x2
+ ∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂x2∂x1
2 ∂
2 p2,ω(x)
∂x22
· · · ∂2 p2,ω(x)
∂xn∂x2
+ ∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂x2∂xn
...
...
. . .
...
∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂x1∂xn
+ ∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂xn∂x1
∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂x2∂xn
+ ∂2 p2,ω(x)
∂xn∂x2
· · · 2 ∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂x2n
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
(38)
is negative semi-definite. By Assumption (A), ∂2 pi,ω(x)/∂x2i ≤ 0, for any i ∈ N .
Therefore, the diagonal matrix
Mω(x) =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂x21
0 · · · 0
0 ∂
2 p2,ω(x)
∂x22
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 ∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂x2n
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
(39)
is negative semi-definite. Consider now some k ∈ N . If fk,ω(xk) > 0, then Lemma A.5
implies that the mapping x˜−k → pk,ω(xk, x˜−k) is convex on Rn−1+ . Moreover, if
fk,ω(xk) = 0, then the mapping x˜−k → pk,ω(xk, x˜−k) equals zero on Rn−1+ \{0}.
Either way, the corresponding Hessian,
Hk,ω(x) =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x21
· · · ∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk−1∂x1
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk+1∂x1 · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xn∂x1
...
. . .
...
...
...
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x1∂xk−1 · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x2k−1
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk+1∂xk−1 · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xn∂xk−1
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x1∂xk+1 · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk−1∂xk+1
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x2k+1
· · · ∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xn∂xk+1
...
...
...
. . .
...
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x1∂xn
· · · ∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk−1∂xn
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk+1∂xn · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x2n
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
, (40)
is positive semi-definite at x . In other words, zT−k Hk,ω(x)z−k ≥ 0 for any
z−k = (z1, . . . , zk−1, zk+1, . . . , zn)T ∈ Rn−1. (41)
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Consider now the matrix
H0k,ω(x) =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x21
· · · ∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk−1∂x1 0
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk+1∂x1 · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xn∂x1
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x1∂xk−1 · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x2k−1
0 ∂
2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk+1∂xk−1 · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xn∂xk−1
0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x1∂xk+1 · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk−1∂xk+1 0
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x2k+1
· · · ∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xn∂xk+1
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x1∂xn
· · · ∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk−1∂xn 0
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xk+1∂xn · · ·
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x2n
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
. (42)
It is straightforward to check that zT H0k,ω(x)z = zT−k Hk,ω(x)z−k ≥ 0 for any
z = (z1, . . . , zn)T ∈ Rn . Thus, the matrix H0k,ω(x) is likewise positive semi-definite.
Summing now over k = 1, . . . , n, we obtain that
n∑
k=1
H0k,ω(x) =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
∑
k =1
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x21
∑
k =2,1
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x2∂x1
· · · ∑k =n,1 ∂
2 pk,ω(x)
∂xn∂x1
∑
k =1,2
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x1∂x2
∑
k =2
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x22
...
...
. . .
...
∑
k =1,n
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂x1∂xn
· · · · · · ∑k =n ∂
2 pk,ω(x)
∂x2n
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
. (43)
Since x = 0, we have ∑nk=1 pk,ω(x) = 1 and, consequently,
∑n
k=1
∂2 pk,ω(x)
∂xi ∂x j = 0 for
arbitrary i, j ∈ N . Hence,
−
n∑
k=1
H0k,ω(x)
=
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂x21
∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂x2∂x1
+ ∂2 p2,ω(x)
∂x2∂x1
· · · ∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂xn∂x1
+ ∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂xn∂x1
∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂x1∂x2
+ ∂2 p2,ω(x)
∂x1∂x2
∂2 p2,ω(x)
∂x22
...
...
. . .
...
∂2 p1,ω(x)
∂x1∂xn
+ ∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂x1∂xn
· · · · · · ∂2 pn,ω(x)
∂x2n
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
(44)
is negative semi-definite. Moreover, using that pi,ω(·) is of the logit form, it is straight-
forward to check that ∂
2 pi,ω(x)
∂xi ∂x j =
∂2 pi,ω(x)
∂x j ∂xi holds for any i, j ∈ N such that j = i .
Thus, Jp,ω(x) + Jp,ω(x)T = Mω(x) − ∑nk=1 H0k,ω(x), and the claim follows. Let
now x ∈ Rn+ possess two or more nonzero components. Then, x−i ∈ Rn−1+ \{0} for all
i ∈ N . In this case, therefore, Mω(x) is negative definite, and so is Jp,ω(x)+ Jp,ω(x)T .
unionsq
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The next lemma establishes an important convexity property of logit contests.
Lemma A.5 For any i ∈ N, ω ∈ , and xi ∈ R+ such that fi,ω(xi ) > 0, the mapping
x−i → pi,ω(xi , x−i ) is convex on Rn−1+ .
Proof Note first that the mapping x−i → ∑ j =i f j,ω(x j ) is concave on Rn−1+ . Indeed,
by Assumption (A), its Hessian is a diagonal matrix with weakly negative entries.
Further, for fi,ω(xi ) > 0 fixed, the mapping Y → fi,ω(xi )fi,ω(xi )+Y is convex and decreasing
on R++. The claim follows therefore from Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 5.1). unionsq
The lemma below recalls two simple matrix-theoretic facts.
Lemma A.6 Let J ∈ Rn×n. If J + J T is negative semi-definite, then zT J z ≤ 0 for
any z ∈ Rn. If J + J T is even negative definite, then zT J z < 0 for any z ∈ Rn\{0}.
Proof Clearly, zT J z = ((zT J )z)T = zT (zT J )T = zT J T (zT )T = zT J T z. Hence,
2zT J z = zT J z + zT J T z = zT (J z + J T z) = zT (J + J T )z. The assertions follow. unionsq
The following lemma is crucial for obtaining the strict inequality in the proof of
Theorem 2.
Lemma A.7 Let β∗ = β∗∗ be two PSNE. Then, there is a state ω0 ∈  such that the
following two conditions hold true:
(i) for any s ∈ (0, 1), the profile of bids βs(t(ω0)) has at least two nonzero components;
(ii) z(ω0) = β∗(t(ω0)) − β∗∗(t(ω0)) = 0.
Proof Select some i ∈ N and θi ∈ i such that β∗i (θi ) = β∗∗i (θi ). Then, clearly,
xmaxi (θi ) > 0. Moreover, by strict quasiconcavity of type θi ’s equilibrium payoff
function, there must be a state ω0 ∈ Pi (θi ) such that β∗−i (t−i (ω0)) = β∗∗−i (t−i (ω0)).
Therefore, βs−i (t−i (ω0)) = 0 for any s ∈ (0, 1). But from β∗i (θi ) = β∗∗i (θi ), it
similarly follows that βsi (ti (ω0)) = 0 for any s ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the vector βs(t(ω0))
indeed has at least two nonzero components, for any s ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, zi (ω0) =
β∗i (ti (ω0)) − β∗∗i (ti (ω0)) = 0, so that z(ω0) = 0. This proves the lemma. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 3 (Existence) For any i ∈ N , let
ex antei (β) =
∑
ω∈ q(ω)i,ω(β(t(ω))) (45)
denote player i’s ex ante expected payoff from the pure-strategy profile β ∈ B. By
Lemma A.8, the n-player game defined through payoff functions (45) is symmetric.
Choose now a sequence {εm}∞m=1 in (0, ε) with limm→∞ εm = 0. Since xmaxπ(i)(·) =
xmaxi (·) for any i ∈ N and any permutation π , also C(εm), defined in the proof of
Theorem 1, is a symmetric n-player game. Hence, by a well-known variant of the
Nikaidô–Isoda theorem (Moulin 1986, pp. 115–116; see also Becker and Damianov
2006), there exists a symmetric PSNE βm in the n-player game C(εm), for any m.
We may assume w.l.o.g. that the sequence {βm}∞m=1 converges to some limit β∗ ∈
B. Clearly, β∗ is a symmetric strategy profile in C. Take any i ∈ N and θi ∈ i
such that xmaxi (θi ) > 0, and let ω ∈ Pi (θi ). As in the proof of Theorem 1, one
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checks that i,ω(·) is continuous at β∗(t(ω)) if either condition (i) or condition (ii)
of Assumption (B’) holds. To prove the existence part, it therefore suffices to show
that, also under condition (iii) of Assumption (B’), i,ω(·) is continuous at β∗(t(ω)).
For this, let ω# ∈ Pi (θi ) be activity-inducing for player i . Then, (ı) the contest is
discontinuous in ω#, (ıı) there exists j ∈ N\{i} such that xmaxj (t j (ω#)) > 0, and (ııı)
for any k ∈ N\{i} such that xmaxk (tk(ω#)) > 0, it holds that tk(ω#) = ti (ω#). Now,
since ω# ∈ Pi (θi ), we have ti (ω#) = ti (ω) = θi . Hence, xmaxi (ti (ω#)) > 0. In view
of (ı) and (ıı), Lemma A.1 implies that β∗(t(ω)) = 0. Moreover, from (ııı) and the
fact that β∗ is a symmetric strategy profile, it follows that, for any k ∈ N\{i} with
xmaxk (tk(ω
#)) > 0, we have β∗k (tk(ω#)) = β∗i (ti (ω#)). In particular, β∗i (ti (ω#)) > 0.
But since ti (ω) = ti (ω#), we find that β∗i (ti (ω)) > 0, so that i,ω(·) is indeed
continuous at β∗(t(ω)). (Uniqueness) Immediate from Theorem 2. unionsq
Our final lemma says that the payoff functions specified in (45) define a symmetric
n-player game.
Lemma A.8 For any i ∈ N, any β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ B, and any permutation π :
N → N, it holds that ex antei (βπ(1), . . . , βπ(n)) = ex anteπ(i) (β1, . . . , βn).
Proof Take any i ∈ N , any β ∈ B, and any permutation π . Consider an arbitrary state
ω ∈  and the corresponding vector of bid realizations x = β(t(ω)) ∈ Rn+. Since
f j,ωπ (·) = fπ( j),ω(·) for any j ∈ N , we have
n∑
j=1
f j,ωπ (xπ( j)) =
n∑
j=1
fπ( j),ω(xπ( j)). (46)
If the left-hand side of (46) is positive, then
pi,ωπ (xπ ) = fi,ωπ (xπ(i))∑n
j=1 f j,ωπ (xπ( j))
= fπ(i),ω(xπ(i))∑n
j=1 fπ( j),ω(xπ( j))
= pπ(i),ω(x). (47)
If, however, the left-hand side of (46) vanishes, then likewise pi,ωπ (xπ ) = p0i,ωπ =
p0π(i),ω = pπ(i),ω(x). Therefore,
i,ωπ (x
π ) = pi,ωπ (xπ )vi (ωπ) − ci,ωπ (xπ(i)) (48)
= pπ(i),ω(x)vπ(i)(ω) − cπ(i),ω(xπ(i)) (49)
= π(i),ω(x). (50)
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It is now straightforward to check that
ex antei (βπ(1), . . . , βπ(n)) =
(45)
∑
ω∈
q(ω)i,ω(βπ(1)(t1(ω)), . . . , βπ(n)(tn(ω))) (51)
=
π one-to-one
∑
ω∈
q(ωπ)i,ωπ (βπ(1)(t1(ωπ)), . . . , βπ(n)(tn(ωπ))) (52)
=
t j (ωπ )=tπ( j)(ω)
∑
ω∈
q(ωπ)i,ωπ (βπ(1)(tπ(1)(ω)), . . . , βπ(n)(tπ(n)(ω))) (53)
=
(48−50)
∑
ω∈
q(ωπ)π(i),ω(β1(t1(ω)), . . . , βn(tn(ω))) (54)
=
q(ωπ )=q(ω)
∑
ω∈
q(ω)π(i),ω(β1(t1(ω)), . . . , βn(tn(ω))) (55)
=
(45)
ex anteπ(i) (β1, . . . βn), (56)
which proves the claim. unionsq
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